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70 BARRE'l'T v. CITY OF CLAREMON''r [41 C.2d 
lL. A. No. :J2543. .In Bank. May 19, 1953.] 
MARY E. BARRETT, Respondent, v. THE CITY OF 
CLAREMONT, Appellant. 
[1] Streets- Injuries Caused by Defects- Liability of Munici-
pality.-Elements essential to a recovery against a munici-
pality under the Public Liability Act of 1923 (Stats. 1923, 
p. 675; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now Gov. Code, 
§§ 53050-53056) for injuries resulting from a dangerous or 
defective condition of the public streets include proof that a 
dangerous condition existed and that the municipality had 
notice or knowledge of it. 
[2] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality.-
Since minor defects inevitably occur in construction and main-
tenance of public streets and their continued existence is not 
unreasonable, no liability may result from injuries due to 
such a condition irrespective of whether the municipality had 
notice of it. 
[3] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality.-
If defect in public street is of such trivial character that it 
presents no element of conspicuousness or notoriety, its con-
tinued existence does not impart constructive notice to the 
municipality. 
[4] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Sidewalks.-It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that it is impossible to maintain a sidewalk in 
a perfect condition and that minor defects are bound to exist. 
[5] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Defects Involving Lia-
bility.-A municipality is not necessarily liable for injuries 
caused by minor defects in a sidewalk due to its continued 
use, and what constitutes a minor defect is not always a mere 
question of fact. 
[6] Id.- Injuries Caused by Defects- Evidence.-In action by 
pedestrian against city for injuries sustained when she tripped 
on ridge of asphaltum filler material protruding above surface 
of sidewalk, evidence showing that the asphaltum filler may 
become soft and sticky on warm days does not support an 
inference that she slipped on the substance. 
[7] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Evidence: Questions of Law 
and Fact.-In action by pedestrian against city for injuries 
sustained when she tripped on ridge of asphaltum filler material 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 461 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Highways, § 348 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Streets, § 71; [4] Evidence, § 62; 
[5] Streets, § 78(1); [6] Streets, § 90; [7) Streets, §§ 90, 91(2). 
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protruding above surface of sidewalk, no negligence on part 
of city is shown by evidence that such ridge, at its highest 
point, was only one-half inch above the surface of the side-
walk, and that it did not rise sharply to that height but curved 
gradually upward from each edge toward the center, since the 
defect must be deemed to be a minor one, and hence it must 
be concluded, as a matter of law, that no injury would be sus-
tained by one exercising reasonable care in the use of the side-
walk. (Disapproving Barrett v. City of Sacramento, 128 Cal. 
App. 708, 18 P.2d 356.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Victor R. Hansen, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action against city for damages for personal injuries sus-
tained by pedestrian as result of fall due to defect in side-
walk. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker 
for Appellant. 
Knight, Gitelson, Ashton & Hagenbaugh, Van Hagenbaugh 
and Leon J. Alexander for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Mary E. Barrett sued the city of Clare-
mont for damages, charging the defendant with negligence 
in the construction and maintenance of a public sidewalk. 
The injuries which she sustained resulted from a fall occur-
ring when she tripped upon a ridge of asphaltum :filler ma-
terial protruding above the surface of the walk. Whether 
that defect was a trivial or substantial one is the principal 
question presented upon the appeal from the judgment against 
the city. 
In 1938, the city constructed a sidewalk, approximately 10 
[(~et wide, consisting of concrete slabs about 4 inches thick. 
A space of lf2 inch, extending the entire width of the walk, 
was left between the slabs to accommodate changes in tem-
perature. Although standard building practice called for 
:filling such space with asphaltum to a height of % to lf2' 
inch below the top of contiguous slabs, the :filler in the joint 
in question was made level with the surface of the sidewalk. 
'rhe black :filler material readily absorbs the rays of the sun. 
On warm days, its internal temperature may rise to a point 
greatly above that of the surrounding air, causing the material 
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to become soft. Warm weather also expands the concrete slabs, 
pushing the filler material up and out of the joint. People 
using the sidewalk step upon the small ridge created and 
spread the material over the sidewalk's surface. As a result 
of this process, sufficient asphaltum had been expelled from 
the joint upon which Miss Barrett tripped to create a ridge 
about 5 inches wide. At the center, its highest point, the ridge 
was about ¥2 inch above the surface of the sidewalk and 
tapered gradually on each side to the level of the walk. 
The accident occurred in the afternoon of a warm day in 
June. Because of a crust of dirt and other substances, the 
surface of the ridge appeared to be normal but the center was 
soft. Miss Barrett, while walking along the sidewalk, caught 
her toe upon the strip and fell. 
The present action was commenced pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Public Liability Act of 1923 (Stats. 1923, 
p. 675; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now Gov. Code, 
§ § 53050-53056). Her complaint alleged that she had suf-
fered an injury as a result of a dangerous and defective con-
dition of the sidewalk and that the defendant city had notice 
of such condition but failed to remedy it. By its answer, the 
city denied generally the allegations of the complaint and 
pleaded affirmatively the defense of contributory negligence. 
A jury awarded Miss Barrett damages. Motions by the city 
for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, and for a new trial were denied. The appeal is from 
the judgment entered upon the verdict. 
The city takes the position that, as a matter of law, the 
defect must be deemed to have been a minor or trivial one. 
Another contention is that the trial court improperly rejected 
an offer of proof that the records of the city between 1940 and 
1948 would disclose that, with the exception of the claim of 
Miss Barrett, no report had been made of an accident having 
occurred at that joint or at any other joint in the streets of 
the city. 
The Public Liability Act of 1923 provides that a munici-
pality shall be liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous 
or defective condition of the public streets in all cases where 
having notice or knowledge of the condition those persons 
having authority to remedy it fail, within a reasonable time, 
to do so. [1] Elements essential to a recovery under this 
statute include proof that a dangerous condition existed and 
that the municipality had notice or knowledge of it. (Nichol-
son v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 361, 363 [54 P.2d 725].) 
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[2] A determination of whether the defect involved is a 
minor or trivial one may be material to the establishment of 
each of these requirements. Growing out of the difficulty of 
maintaining heavily traveled surfaces in perfect condition is 
the practical recognition that minor defects inevitably occur, 
both in construction and maintenance, and that their con-
tinued existence is not unreasonable. In such case, irrespective 
of the question of notice of the condition, no liability may 
result. (Graves v. Roman, 113 Cal.App.2d 584, 586-587 [248 
P.2d 508] ; Robson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 70 Cal.App.2d 
759, 761-762 [161 P.2d 821]; Clarke v. Foster's Inc., 51 Cal. 
App.2d 411, 414 [125 P.2d 60] ; Sischo v. City of Los Banos, 
37 Cal.App.2d 717, 718 [100 P.2d 305].) 
[3] The same problem may arise in connection with the 
question of notice. In many instances, the plaintiff cannot show 
actual notice of the condition and must rely upon the con-
structive notice imputed to the municipality by the passage 
of time. (Hook v. City of Sacramento, 118 Cal.App. 547, 553 
[5 P.2d 643]; Dawson v. Tulare Union High Sch., 98 Cal. 
App. 138, 142 [276 P. 424] .) The theory of those decisions 
is that the city, had it performed its duty of conducting a 
reasonable inspection, would have had actual knowledge of 
the existence of a dangerous defect. (See Nicholson v. City of 
Los Angeles, supra, pp. 364-365.) If the defect is of such 
trivial character that it presents no element of conspicuous-
ness or notoriety, its continued existence does not impart con-
structive notice to the municipality. (Whiting v. City of N a-
tional City, 9 Cal.2d 163, 166 [69 P.2d 990]; Nicholson v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra, pp. 367-368; Balmer v. City of 
Beverly II ills, 22 CaLA pp.2d 529, 531 [ 71 P .2d 854].) 
The plaintiff contends that, in any event, the question 
of whether the defect was trivial or substantial is one of fact, 
which the jury has resolved in her favor. [4] But, as was said 
in Whiting v. City of National City, supra, "[i]t is a matter 
of common knowledge that it is impossible to maintain a 
sidewalk in a perfect condition. Minor defects are bound to 
exist. [5] A municipality cannot be expected to maintain the 
surface of its sidewalks free from all inequalities and from 
every possible obstruction to travel. Minor defects due to 
continued use, or action of the elements, or other cause, will 
not necessarily make the city liable for injuries caused there-
by. What constitutes a minor defect is not always a mere 
question of fact. If the rule were otherwise the city could be 
held liable upon a showing of a trivial defect." (P. 165.) 
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Miss Rarrett argueR that the physical 
asphaltum filler material di&tinguish the present case from 
those involving trivial cldect:>. In this connection, she relies 
upon Lmtie v. Hagstrom's Food Stm·es, Inc., 81 Cal.App.2d 
601 [184 P.2d 708 j, affirming an award of damages for injury 
caused by slipping upon a puddle of syrup on the floor of a 
grocery store. To bring herself within the rule of that case, 
she characterizes the ridge of asphaltum as a "sticky puddle." 
[6] The evidence most favorable to Miss Barrett shows 
only that the asphaltum filler may become soft and sticky 
on warm days. It does not support an inference that she 
slipped upon the substance. Her answer to the direct inquiry 
of whether she had a sensation of slipping was in the negative. 
She stated that, as she stepped upon the ridge in such manner 
as to place her full weight upon her rig·ht foot, the tip of her 
toe "caught" or "stuck" in the substance, retarding her 
forward motion and throwing her off balance. 
[7] The record does not show that the small amount of 
asphaltum above the level of the sidewalk presented any 
greater danger of injury than that disclosed in other trivial 
defect cases. The accident occurred on one of the busiest 
streets of the city. Miss Barrett had traveled it many times. 
At its highest point, the ridge was only lh inch above the 
surface of the sidewalk. Moreover, it did not rise sharply 
to that height but curved gradually upward from each edge 
toward the center, much in the same manner as a common 
doorsill. Many decisions hold that defects of a greater magni-
tude than that shown here are minor ones. (Whiting v. City 
of National C-ity, supra [adjoining sidewalk panels differing 
in elevation % inch at the highest point] ; Nicholson v. City 
of Los Angeles, supra, [1% inches difference in elevation] ; 
Sischo v. City of Los Banos, supm [grade in sidewalk of 
58/100 inch per foot]; Balmer v. City of Beverly Hills, supra 
[1 inch difference in elevation of sidewalk panels] ; Dunn v. 
Wagner·, 22 Cal.App.2d 51, 54 [70 P.2d 498] [1 inch rise in 
sidewalk]; Meyer v. City of Sam Rafael, 22 Cal.App.2d 46, 50 
[70 P.2d 533] [adjoining sidewalk panels varying from % 
inch to 1% inches in height].) Accordingly, the defect here 
concerned must be deemed to have been one within that cate-
gory. 
In the cases relied upon by the respondent which hold 
that the question of negligence is one of fact, either different 
circumstances were shown by the record or the question as to 
what constitutes a trivial defect was not discussed. (FackreU 
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v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196 [157 P.2d 625, 158 .A.L.R. 
625] [pothole in sidewalk from 5 inches to 2 feet deep]; 
Anderson v. County of Joaquin, llO Cal..App.2d 703 [244 
P.2d 75] [chuckhole 2 to 6 inches deep]; Murphy v. County 
of Lake, 106 Cal..App.2d 61 [234 P.2d 712] [question of 
whether or not defect was a minor one not raised] ; 
Warren v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal..App.2d 678 [205 P.2d 
719] [hole 2 inches deep, 10 inches square, containing oil and 
grease]; Owen v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal.App.2d 933 
[187 P.2d 860] (hole 9-11 inches long, 4-6 inches wide, and 
2-3¥2 inches deep] ; Louie v. Hagstrom's Food Stores, supra 
[puddle of syrup on floor, 6 to 8 inches wide]; Maddern v. 
City & County of San F'ramcisco, 74 Cal.App.2d 742 [169 
P.2d 425] (depression in street 65 to 80 feet long, 10 to 12 
feet wide, and 8 to 10 feet deep] ; Sheldon v. City of Los 
Angeles, 55 Cal..App.2d 690 [131 P.2d 874] [depression in 
sidewalk 1¥2 inches deep J ; Balkwill v. City of Stockton, 
50 Cal..App.2d 661 [123 P.2d 596) [hole in sidewalk 5 inches 
long, 2 inches wide, and 2 inches deep); Allen v. City of Los 
Angeles, 43 Cal..App.2d 65 [110 P.2d 75] [bridge raised 2 
inches above sidewalk] ; Ackers v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 
App.2d 50 [104 P.2d 399] [hole in sidewalk 12 inches long, 
3 inches wide, and 2 inches deep]; Hook v. City of Sacramento, 
supra [hole 2 feet long, 18 inches wide, and 1¥2 inches 
deep].) Barrett v. City of Sacramento, 128 Cal..App. 708 
[18 P.2d 356], decided prior to the Nicholson and Whiting 
cases, is not in harmony with those decisions and is dis-
approved. 
From the minor nature of the defect here concerned 
it must be concluded, as a matter of law, that no injury would 
be sustained by one exercising reasonable care in the use of 
the sidewalk. Accordingly, a finding of negligence on the 
part of the city is without support in the evidence. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
1 o grant the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding 
Jhe verdict. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CAR'l'ER, ,J.--I dissent. 
'fhis case presents a factual situation which is resolved 
as a matter of law by the majority, in spite of the finding by 
the jury and the trial court on denial of a motion for a new 
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trial, and a determination by the unanimous decision of the 
District Court of Appeal. I adopt the decision of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirming the judgment on the ver-
dict as ably disposing of the case. (Barrett v. City of Clare-
mont, (Cal.App.) 247 P.2d 113.) 
There is no doubt that, under the public liability law (Gov. 
Code, § 53050 et seq.), in order for the city to be liable, 
there must be a dangerous or defective condition and the city 
must have either actual or constructive knowledge thereof. 
The majority opinion discusses both of those features but ap-
parently rests its decision on but one, namely, lack of a dan-
gerous or defective condition, and hence, no negligence, be-
cause the defect was trivial. More will be said concerning that 
issue later. 
Both of those issues are determinable, and were properly 
determined, by the trier. of fact. We said in Fackrell v. City 
of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196, 206 [157 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.R. 
625] : "Whether a given set of circumstances creates a dan-
gerous or defective condition is primarily a question of fact.'' 
The test as to whether it becomes a question of law is stated 
in Owen v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal.App.2d 933, 938 
[187 P.2d 860] : " ... whether a condition is defective or 
clangerotts is one which calls for the application of the rule 
that where there is room for difference of opinion among 
reasonable minds, the question is one of fact." (Emphasis 
added.) Here, the jury, the learned trial judge and three able 
justices of the District Court of Appeal-all possessing reason-
able minds-concluded that reasonable minds could conclude 
that the defect was dangerous. The principle is cogently 
stated in Stone v. New York C. &; St. L. R. Co., 344 U.S. 
407 [73 S.Ct. 358, 97 L.Ed. 441, 445], where the court 
was dealing with the question of negligence. 'While there were 
three dissenters, they did not disagree with the principle here 
involved. The court said: ''The standard of liability is negli-
gence. . . . Tu us it appears to be a debatable issue on which 
fm:r-m1:nded men would differ . ... Those circumstances were 
for the trier of facts to appraise." (Emphasis added.) Apply-
ing those rules to the instant case compels the conclusion that 
reasonable minds-'' fair-minded men' '-could conclude that 
the defect was a dangerous one. 
In fact, the soft tarry substance became not only a dan-
gerous condition by its protuberance above the sidewalk but 
was a trap for the unwary. It would look substantial to a 
pedestrian but, being soft and sticky, the pedestrian would, as 
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plaintiff did here, unknowingly step on it and her foot would 
sink in. 'rhere was sufficient cohesive quality to cause her 
foot to stick, at least momentarily. That was enough to throw 
her off her stride and result in an imbalance and fall. Certainly, 
reasonable men could call such a condition dangerous and de-
fective. 
In the foregoing discussion, I have accepted the facts as 
stated by the majority as complete,-that is, that there was 
a 1;2-inch high asphalt hump across the sidewalk which arose 
by reason of that substance being placed between the slabs of 
concrete in a crevice left therefor to accommodate the expan-
sion and contraction; that the common standard practice is 
to install the asphalt in the crevice to a point % inch below 
the surface of the sidewalk. That was not done here ; the 
city caused the asphalt to be flush with the sidewalk surface. 
Thus it definitely appears that the sidewalk was negligently 
constructed from the beginning, being contrary to the standard 
practice. Deviation from custom or standard practice may 
constitute negligence (19 Cal.Jur. 581-583). The jury could 
have so found here. The evidence shows that it is the tendency 
of asphalt to work upward and out of a crevice and not return. 
'l'hat is what happened here to the extent of % inch. If it had 
been properly installed it would have worked upward only to 
the surface of the sidewalk. We have, therefore, negligence 
in the installation of the asphalt and it necessarily follows 
that the city knew of it because it made that installation itself. 
There is even more evidence of knowledge. The city's super-
intendent of streets testified that the condition of the asphalt 
in and on this sidewalk had been the same since 1940. Thus 
the city had double actual knowledge of the defective con-
dition. 
Under the foregoing circumstances, there is no room for the 
application of the "trivial" defect exception to liability be-
cause, if it were applied, the city would escape liability where 
it knowingly created and maintained a dangerous defect as 
long as it was small. Indeed, it could create as many and as 
dangerous pitfalls as it wished and be subject to no liability 
when it kept them unobstrusive. No such strained construc-
tion of the public liability act should be indulged. 
'rhe trivial defect rule is court-made, as the statute makes 
no distinction between dangerous or defective conditions ac-
eording to their magnitude, and in most of the cases, it has 
been relied upon to hold that there could not be constructive 
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5 Cal.2d 361 [54 P .2d ) . In this case, as 
the had actual notice~the facts con-
elusively establish it. Therefore, the rule of the Nicholson 
case is not applicable here. 
As to its applicability on the question of whether the 
condition is dangerous or defective, we also have direct evi-
dence, as seen from the foregoing, that the condition was de-
fective ancZ fraught with danger. The majority seeks to escape 
the result of that evidence by stating that there are cases 
which hold that a defect may be so trivial that it does not 
constitute a dangerous condition. In none of those cases, 
however, was the defect actually known or created by the 
defendant, and for that reason, it was held that defendant 
need not anticipate an injury arising from it. The basic case 
that the majority relies upon is Whiting v. City of National 
City, 9 Cal.2d 163 [69 P.2d 990], which was concerned solely 
with the question of notice, rather than whether a defect may 
be so trivial as to constitute no hazard. Where, as here, the 
city had actual knowledge of the defect and knew that the 
construction was contrary to standard practice, there is no 
basis whatsoever for saying that it could not anticipate an 
injury. No question is presented as to whether the city, as 
a responsible person, should have anticipated the injury, be-
cause, in view of its knowledge it must have expected it. 
Moreover, it is firmly established that a dangerous or de-
fective condition may be the basis for liability by the use of 
a general plan of operation of city operated property as well 
as by a structural defect. (George v. City of Los Angeles, 
11 Cal.2d 303 [79 P.2d 72:3] ; Battman v. San Franciseo, 42 
Cal.App.2d 144 [108 P.2d 989]; Wexler v. City of Los An-
geles, 110 Cal.App.2d 740 [243 P.2d 868].) That situation 
is presented here because the method of construction of the 
sidewalk was contrary to the accepted standard. 
:B'inaJly, there is a basis for the jury's verdict which is not 
mentioned in the majority opinion. There was a strip of 
asphalt on the sidewalk. It is a tarry substance which, on 
warm days, becomes soft and sticky. The accident occurred 
on a warm day. The surface of the asphalt appeared gray 
in color, concealing its lack of firmness and adhesive char-
acter. The city knew all of those things yet permitted the 
condition to exist. Plaintiff stepped on this asphalt and the 
toe of her shoe momentarily adhered to the asphalt, retarding 
the forward motion of her foot, thus throwing her off balance 
and into a fall. That makes out a case of negligence against 
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defendant. It is indistinguishable from the slippery floor 
cases where wax has been applied to the floor. There the in-
jured person slips and falls. Here, one foot is retarded for 
sufficient time to destroy her balance and a fall results. It 
is settled that where a floor is made slippery by the applica-
tion of wax, the possessor of the property is liable for injury 
to a business visitor who slips and falls on the floor. (Hatfield 
v. Levy Brothers, 18 Oal.2d 798 (117 P.2d 841] ; Lorenz v. 
Santa Monica etc. Sch. Dist., 51 CaLApp.2d 393 (124 P.2d 
846] ; Nicola v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 50 Cal. App.2d 612 [123 
P.2d 529]; Williamson v. Hardy, 47 Cal.App. 377 (190 P. 
646] ; Lamb v. Purity Stores, Inc., 119 Oal.App. 690 [7 P.2d 
197] ; Brinkworth v. Sam Seelig Co., 51 Cal.App. 668 [197 P. 
427]; Brown v. Holzwasser, Inc., 108 Cal.App. 483 [291 P. 
661]; Henderson v. Progressive etc. System., 57 Cal.App.2d 180 
[134 P.2d 807); Cagle v. Bakersfield Medical Grottp, 110 Cal. 
App.2d 77 [241 P.2d 1013] .) Those cases also hold that 
whether maintenance of the slippery floor is negligence is for 
the trier of fact. If the maintenance of a slippery condition is 
negligence so is the maintenance of a sticky surface as either 
condition may cause injury. 
The majority enunciates no rule, fixes no standard, estab-
lishes no basis for determining what condition constitutes 
a trivial defect for which there is no liability, or for the de-
termination of what is a dangerous and defective condition 
for which liability may be imposed. The trier of fact-the 
jury or trial judge-is required to speculate as to what four 
members of this court may ultimately conceive to be a dan-
gerous and defective condition within the purview of the 
public liability statute. Even though the jury and trial judge 
may have viewed the premises, the result would be the same. 
Without some standard for the determination of what con-
stitutes a dangerous and defective condition, there is nothing 
to guide the trial court and jury in any case. 
The traditional rule that, ·where the factual situation is such 
that reasonable minds might differ, the issue is one of fact, is 
ignored by the majority. It must necessarily ignore this rule, 
because to apply it in the case at bar, would require the ma-
jority to say that the jury, the trial judge and the three jus-
tices of the Distriet Court of Appeal who ruled in favor of 
plaintiff, did not have reasonable minds. To avoid this absurd 
holding, the majority predicates its decision on its own con-
cept of what is a dangerous and defective condition, and 
holds that notwithstanding the finding of the jury, the trial 
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judge and the unanimous decision of the District Court of 
Appeal, the defect here proven did not constitute a dangerous 
and defective condition even though plaintiff suffered a serious 
injury as a result of such defect. In other words, the only 
standard is what the majority of this court fixes in each in-
diYiclual case. This is not announcing a rule of law-it is a 
rule of four men-who may be for the time being, men who 
have a preconceived notion in cases such as this, and who are 
disposed to usurp the function of the jury and trial judge in 
a grasp for power-power denied them by the Constitution 
and laws of this state. Because the Constitution and laws 
of this state guarantee to litigants in a case such as this, the 
right to trial by jury, which means that factual issues are to 
be determined by the jury. Those factual issues were so de-
termined, and in view of the ruling of the trial court in 
denying a motion for a new trial and the decision of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirming that ruling, that determination 
should be final. 
As I have heretofore pointed out, this court is presented 
with numerous propositions of law of tremendous importance 
to the people of this state, the determination of which would 
consume all of the time available to the members of this court, 
without undertaking to review and redeeide issues of fact, 
and I again state that cases such as this, involving only issues 
of fact, and which were correctly decided by the trial court and 
the District Court of Appeal, should not have been taken over 
and redecided by this court. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11, 
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
